Ebad Teimouri; Mohsen Renani; Abdolhamid Moarefi Mohammadi
Abstract
There is no convincing explanation in public choice theory for the "paradox of voting". Despite the prediction that rational individuals will decide to abstain, lots of citizens still vote. The paradox of voting crops up when one tries to explain the decision to vote in an exclusively instrumental framework. ...
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There is no convincing explanation in public choice theory for the "paradox of voting". Despite the prediction that rational individuals will decide to abstain, lots of citizens still vote. The paradox of voting crops up when one tries to explain the decision to vote in an exclusively instrumental framework. In other words, the voting paradox arises because of the flawed notion of rationality held by public choice. By applying another concept of rationality, a deeper and more appropriate viewpoint can be made on how citizens make voting decisions and resolve the paradox of voting. It allows us to explain voting decisions as rational (the voter judges there to be good reasons for his decisions) without interpreting them as instrumentally motivated. In this research, the proposed strategies for solving the paradox of the voting are criticized based on logical reasoning. Then institutional rationality, which is compatible with the methodological approach of institutional economics, has been used to provide a new explanation of the voting decisions of individuals. The results of the theoretical analysis show that institutional rationality can help to solve the paradox of voting.
Ebad Teimouri; Mohsen Renani; Abdolhamid Moarefi Mohammadi
Abstract
The starting point of economic analyses undoubtedly is homo economicus, whose fundamental characteristic is rationality. In recent decades, the notion of rationality has been the subject of debates in social sciences, particularly economics. Conventional economists often employ the assumption of rationality ...
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The starting point of economic analyses undoubtedly is homo economicus, whose fundamental characteristic is rationality. In recent decades, the notion of rationality has been the subject of debates in social sciences, particularly economics. Conventional economists often employ the assumption of rationality in the sense that economic agents are aware of all potential consequences and capable of logical and consistent choices that maximize utility. However, critics of economic rationality argue that these agents sometimes exhibit irrational behaviors and are not always aware of all the possible consequences of their choices. Many of the behavioral economists and psychologists maintain that economic agents do not reason very well, that these agents often do not know what is good for them and that they behave in odd, non-reasoning, inconsistent ways, because of their limited mental capabilities and environmental conditions. In this article, with a comparative approach, the rational choice theory and criticisms of behavioral economics to it are analyzed. Moreover, new findings of brain function and experimental economics are examined to a deeper understanding of economic rationality and assessment its compliance with human behavior and mental abilities. The results show that although it can be acknowledged that people with regards to their limitations and capabilities of the brain do not follow perfect rationality in all everyday decisions and choices, the existence of pervasive irrational behavior can’t be recognized in all aspects of human life and people probably act more rational than what behavioral economics assumes.
